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The neurological and wider clinical domains 
stand to gain greatly from the vision of the Grid in 
providing seamless yet secure access to distributed, 
heterogeneous  computational resources and data 
sets. Whilst a wealth of clinical data exists within 
local, regional and national healthcare boundaries, 
access to and usage of these data sets demands that 
fine grained security is supported and subsequently 
enforced. This paper explores the security 
challenges of the e-Health domain, focusing in 
particular on authorization. The context of these 
explorations is the MRC funded VOTES (Virtual 
Organisations for Trials and Epidemiological 
Studies) and the JISC funded GLASS (Glasgow 
early adoption of Shibboleth project) which are 
developing Grid infrastructures for clinical trials 





The neurological and wider healthcare 
domain has an abundance of data spread across 
many regions. The scientific and medical value 
of this data has the potential to be significantly 
enhanced, if it can be accessed and used across 
these boundaries. It is currently largely the 
case however that these data sets exist in silos 
and cannot be linked even within the 
healthcare domain with primary and secondary 
care often driven by non-electronic (paper-
based) information exchange. 
Grid technology “in principle” provides an 
infrastructure that would allow federation of 
data to occur. However, Grid technologies and 
standards, such as those described in the Open 
Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [22], will 
only be adopted by the health domain if they 
can visibly demonstrate that they address all 
potential security concerns of patients, 
clinicians, IT support staff and ethical bodies.  
In the clinical domain, many IT and data 
storage solutions already exist for individual 
GP practises, disease registries, clinical 
repositories and hospitals. Most of these 
solutions have been developed in isolation and 
as a result have widely differing data 
descriptions and associated security policies, 
which in turn require any solution to take 
account of the idiosyncrasies of these 
heterogeneous sources. The National Health 
Service (NHS) is not focused upon keeping 
data private or inaccessible, but in delivering 
health care. This provides a compelling reason 
for the controlled sharing of data sets. 
The VOTES project (Virtual Organisations 
for Trials and Epidemiological Studies) [1] is 
exploring this space, specifically with regard 
to clinical trials and epidemiological studies. 
The VOTES project is addressing three key 
areas of clinical trials, which stand to benefit 
most from the development of an underlying 
grid infrastructure: 
 
• Patient Recruitment – asking specific 
demographic and/or clinical questions 
combined with the individual patient 
histories which can subsequently be 
used for identifying patients. 
• Data Collection – typically involves 
following up on the data produced by 
a clinical trial. 
• Study Management – monitoring the 
overall running of a trial and making 
sure that the interests of the patient 
are being maintained, and that the 
trial is being run according to ethical 
procedures. 
 
By federating the data pertaining to these 
various areas from separate domains 
throughout the country and the world, it is 
believed that greater and more effective 
statistical and scientific insight into the results 
of such trials can be obtained and disseminated. 
One example of a needed data federation, 
of the kind that VOTES is detailed to address, 
is the brain trauma domain. The BrainIT 
project [2] is a European wide network looking 
at brain trauma. In particular, it focuses on 
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understanding brain trauma, and especially 
how patients are monitored and treated as a 
whole. This domain has a rich range of 
heterogeneous data sets which need to be 
seamlessly linked including MRI images and 
physiological data sets amongst others.  
At present the network send their data 
through to a centralised data repository at 
Glasgow Southern General Hospital. However 
this has numerous disadvantages. We explore 
these in this paper and present a model 
whereby fine grained security can be used to 
allow sites to maintain their own data sets and 
define and enforce their own security policies 
on access and usage.  
The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Grid security in the large and the challenges of 
the health domain. Section 3 focuses upon the 
approaches taken within the VOTES project to 
address these challenges with the proposed 
security model and section 4 focuses on the 
implementation work with focus, in particular 
on the brain trauma domain.  
 
2. Authorization in the Clinical 
Domain 
 
Due to the sensitivity of data in the 
clinical/health domain, the establishment of 
security policies and their rigorous 
enforcement is of paramount importance. 
However, due to the variety of scenarios and 
ranges of different clinical trials and studies 
requirements each with their own particular 
data or security demands and nuances, there is 
a need for a flexible solution. In short, we wish 
to build infrastructures where a variety of data 
is dynamically accessible to different 
individuals for different times for different 
reasons. In any of these systems however fine-
grained access to individual data sets is 
essential. 
As an example, when collating data for 
statistical purposes, e.g. to check for the 
feasibility of conducting a given trial in a 
given area, it may be necessary for users with 
low privileges to view broad demographical 
data. However, it may also be necessary for 
users of higher privilege to view more personal 
data, and in some cases, data that will 
positively identify patients. In a given 
institution or hospital, this might be achievable, 
however when multiple institutions with 
numerous stakeholders are involved this 
becomes a much more fraught process. 
It is an unavoidable fact however that the 
specific privileges required in a trial will not 
be known when the system is first created. 
Similarly a doctor in one hospital may have 
privilege to access various systems in that 
hospital, but these do not transfer directly 
when this doctor attends a different hospital 
for example.  
Therefore a dynamic architecture capable 
of adding and removing resources “on the fly” 
is necessary, where the corresponding 
allocation of privileges can be added or 
removed depending on the needs of different 
trials or healthcare systems. Grid-based 
solutions offer one possibility to address this.  
The basic tenets of Grid-security can be 
broadly broken down into the “AAA” 
categories of authentication (establishing 
identity), authorization (establishing and 
enforcing privilege) and accountability 
(establishing activities and time of particular 
identities). Though other important aspects of 
security exist, this paper focuses on 
authentication and authorization as these are 
arguably the most important security features, 
without which other security features are 
largely redundant.  
Methods of authentication with grid 
technology tend to favour two methods, either 
username/password combinations or public 
key infrastructures (PKIs) to set up and use a 
safer, encrypted communication channels 
through trusting a third party root of trust 
Certification Authority. Authentication is 
focused upon identity management hence a 
process exists through which a user establishes 
their identity in the process of obtaining their 
X.509 digital certificate.  
Typically this is done through showing 
some form of physical identification to a local 
registration authority at their institution. 
However there are issues with this process, not 
least of which is the complexity of converting 
certificates to Grid formats and the lack of 
local monitoring. Thus a user might be 
expelled from their institution but still have 
access to a valid Grid certificate.  
One middleware solution that is being 
widely touted as the answer to this issue is that 
of Shibboleth [3]. Shibboleth provides a 
method of securely transferring attributes 
between institutions subscribing to an over-
arching federation. The basic model of 
Shibboleth is that users attempting to access a 
remote resource are redirected to their home 
institution (typically through a Where Are You 
From service) where they log in locally. A 
digitally signed SAML assertion showing that 
the user has authenticated is then delivered to 
the target resource which may then decide 
whether access is granted or not. Often further 
information such as attributes for authorisation 
need to be returned.  
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Figure 1: A diagram of the envisaged clinical virtual organisation (CVO) between the partners. 
 
This whole process however is transparent 
to the end users who only log in to their local 
system with the normal usernames and 
passwords.  This aspect should not be ignored. 
Usability of secure systems is one of the 
primary causes of security incidents. Strong 
password policies and software that ensures 
passwords are of sufficient strength are made 
redundant by users who write them down. (The 
UK Certificate Authority currently mandates 
that private key passwords are 16 characters 
long and made up of upper/low alpha and non-
alphanumeric characters. As such it has been 
documented [17, 18] that users write their 
passwords down or share them with colleagues.  
The key benefit of Shibboleth is that end 
users have simple ways to access resources.  
Furthermore depending upon local policies and 
trust relationships across the federation, users 
are able to access a range of distributed 
resources thereby supporting single sign-on. 
Once a secure session between a user and a 
resource is established, the user can access 
further resources (in the same federation) 
without the need to further authenticate – 
based upon browser-based information. 
Additionally since their authentication is tied 
to their local institution, they will have their 
federation privileges revoked, if they are 
revoked locally (which is the most likely 
scenario). 
Authorization which typically involves 
access to remote resources (or vice versa) 
remains a far more intractable issue than 
authentication. Many technologies have 
attempted to address the problem of remote 
privilege allocation and enforcement, but none 
provide a single package that meets all the 
needs of most distributed systems. 
One authorization solution that is gaining 
acceptance in the academic community is 
PERMIS (Privilege and Role Management 
Infrastructure Standards Validation) [4]. This 
middleware package implements a policy 
engine to act upon hierarchical role based 
access control policies encoded in XML.  
The application is based on the X.812 | ISO 
10181-3 Access Control framework [5], 
providing a policy decision and enforcement 
point between the initiator and the target. 
PERMIS has been coded to plug in to the 
Globus Toolkit Grid middleware [8], 
protecting grid services by the use of the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
protocol [16]. As services protected in this way 
necessarily use Globus constructs and 
packages, there is only a limited number of 
ways that the application can be used. 
Another issue is that the application is also 
designed to be used on a “per-service” basis - 
i.e. the granularity of authorization is such that 
only distinct services can be individually 
secured. In the field of data federation, a finer-
grained method of authorization is required 
and hence the PERMIS solution is not ideal for 
providing the flexibility needed in this field. 
Another example of such authorization 
applications is that of VOMS (Virtual 
Organisations Management System) [6]. The 
VOMS system implements a series of grid-
map files – basic authorization files used by 
the Globus Toolkit that match user DNs 
(Distinguished Names) to services – to provide 
greater flexibility in establishing a secure 
authorization protocol. 
However, the system does not implement a 
decision enforcement engine (c.f. the policy 
engine in PERMIS) and is also strongly-bound 
to the middleware applications developed for 
the particle physics community. In terms of 
implementation, this makes its integration with 
software for other scientific areas, with other 
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application interfaces, notoriously difficult. At 
the other end of the authorization process from 
these VO-wide technologies – the 
authorization methods of the local database 
resources – it is actually possible to set very 
fine-grained security policies that allocate 
privileges of individual data fields to the 
various roles. However, in the context of 
distributed grid systems, the problem is that 
this model does not scale up to the level of 
large scale dynamic virtual organisations. By 
the same token, the administrator of the local 
resource must have the final say as to what 
roles can and cannot get access to their 
resource.  
Any effective security solution to be 
applied to the field of distributed data 
federation in the health domain, must address 
both of these paradigms. On the one hand, the 
local resource administrator must find a way to 
translate their local security policies to a 
common interface that can be understood by 
remote users as well as local. On the other 
hand, there must be a way for the remote users 
to gain fine-grained and secure access to 
individual data fields and parameters. One 
dichotomy with this is with regard to how such 
information is made available, since in general 
security information is not typically published 
and this is especially so in the clinical domain.  
 
3. VOTES Security Model 
 
The VOTES project is an attempt to realise 
a software solution to the challenges inherent 
in federating distributed clinical data. The Grid 
enabling of the BrainIT project being 
undertaken within the GLASS project is a 
similar endeavour that deals directly with 
secure, remote access to distributed medical 
data specific to the neurological domain. As 
the two projects have similar goals and 
challenges the solutions have dove-tailed into 
the one application, the architectural details of 
which can be found in section 4. This section 
focuses on the security theory and outlines the 
solution that has been incorporated into the 
design of the VOTES portal. 
 
3.1 Portal Overview 
 
Usability is at the heart of VOTES efforts 
and portal based solutions have been 
prototyped with this in mind. This should be 
usable for end users, administrators, 
investigators involved in clinical trials. To 
support this, a node infrastructure that can be 
replicated to add or remove various institutions 
that wish to contribute or query clinical data by 
becoming a member of the VO. Figure 1 
shows an overall schematic representation of 
such a VO. Each node is populated with a 
replicated and mirrored portal, grid and data 
servers. Through these components, queries 
are sent to a local pool of databases, guarded 
by a driving database, which joins the data to 
present a seemingly unified resource back to 
the end user. Figure 5 (in section 4) shows the 
architecture of the Glasgow node of this virtual 
organisation, with these components all 
marked.  
These nodes are to be connected by way of 
the data servers, providing seamless access to a 
rich range of clinical data sets. Subject to the 
establishment of trust between two nodes, the 
exchange of data can be readily available to 
the entire VO, once the necessary 
authorization privilege files are appropriately 
set.  
The basic authorization is based on the 
roles assigned to the user. A privileged user 
will be allowed to query a wider set of 
parameters on the various resources than a less 
privileged one. Figure 2 shows the different 
parameter sets available for querying for the 
“investigator” and “nurse” roles that are 
attempting to run queries on the same trial 
(labelled “votes2”). Ultimately these roles 
represent levels of privileges – which in this 
case correspond to the data sets that are 
accessible. Defining the relationships between 
a role and a view of a federated set of data is 





Figure 2: the left screen shows the 
parameters available for querying to the 
investigator role; the right shows those 
available to the nurse. Note how the latter 
are less in number and, critically, do not 
contain any identifying data. 
 
3.2 Authorization and Administration 
 
No Grid authorisation middleware today 
provides sufficient granularity to adequately 
express and enforce fine grained authorisation 
policies across large scale federated, 
heterogeneous sets of clinical data. To address 
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this, the VOTES project has adopted a security 
solution based upon an Access Matrix model. 
Figure 3 shows a conceptual model of the 
access matrix: essentially, it comprises several 
tables, one for each database resource (or more 
precisely the schema for the database resource), 
which lists fully-qualified parameter names 
within that database, against the roles of the 
trial. A “1” digit signifies that that role will 
have access to that parameter, a “0” digit 
means that access to that parameter will be 








Figure 3: The access matrix model. For 
each data source, the role versus parameter 
value shows the different privileges. 
 
The central idea is that this access matrix 
will be available at every node in the VO and 
will be regularly updated, as the nature of any 
VO is transient, with resources potentially 
changing rapidly over a short period of time. 
Consequently, every user that has access to the 
VO in some form will go through this matrix 
model to access any other resource, be it local 
or remote, within the VO. 
As VOs are assumed to be transient and 
dynamic in nature, a method for dynamically 
updating this access matrix is mandatory. As 
such an administrative portal has been 
incorporated into the overall design of the 
portal infrastructure. This portal provides a 
method for privileged super-users to set 
policies. As this provides a potentially critical 
security hole in the system, it is crucial that the 
individual duties of these super-users are 
clearly delineated, and that the access to the 
execution of these duties are rigorously 
secured. 
The individual duties for the super-users 
have been identified as being in two categories: 
 
Node Administrator – this super-user is 
responsible for publishing what local resources 
they have. They are responsible for uploading 
their local resource and connection details to 
local files accessible to their local portal. They 
are also responsible for querying the other 
nodes for their resources, and adding any new 
remote resources to their local CVO database. 
This intermediate validation by the node 
administrator hampers the dynamic nature of 
the VO but only to the degree that common 
sense decrees. There must be some human 
intervention to validate the addition of remote 
resources, though there is a case here that if the 
other local node administrators publish their 
local connection details, they can be trusted. 
The issue here is one of binding legal 



















Figure 4: a snapshot of the node 
administrator home page. The duties are 
separated into local and remote resource 
administration. 
 
This role essentially maintains the underlying 
infrastructure upon which the retrieval of 
clinical data can be run. 
 
Trial Administrator – this super-user is 
envisaged to be a clinician more familiar with 
the running of clinical trials than with the 
underlying computing infrastructure. They are 
responsible for the definition and assignment 
of security policies based on their knowledge 
of the clinical trial and the data sets been made 
available by the node administrators. 
A typical scenario is that upon login the 
trial administrator will attempt to create a new 
trial with a new name, and will be able to 
search the database resources available to the 
VO. One challenge we face here is abstracting 
from the primary database contents and 
presenting the information in a human-
readable form. Once they have obtained the 
necessary resources. subject to their 
availability within the VO, they will then be 
able to create roles for that particular trial and 
assign access to the various parameters that the 
databases offer (this will also be subject to the 
discretion of what the node administrator for 
that resource has chosen to release for remote 
access). 
 
3.3 Static Legal Considerations 
 
Any solution provided must be subject to 
the approval of an ethical review board and as 
such, it is not possible to automate the entire 
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procedure of remote federating access to such 
sensitive data. The example of patient consent 
for the recruitment of subjects for a clinical 
trial is one example where human intervention 
is mandatory before the technology can 
automate the rest of the process. 
In the security scenario described above, 
there is a need to establish a static legal 
context between all the nodes within the VO, 
which establishes a base-level of trust between 
the parties. From the delineation of super-user 
duties described above it is clear that a node 
administrator from one node is potentially 
granting the power of privilege allocation on 
their resource to a trial administrator at another 
node. To do this requires a high level of trust 
between the acting parties, which in turn will 
require a legal form of recourse should either 
party feel that their grant of administrative 
rights has been abused. Therefore, a static 
element to this dynamic system is unavoidable 
(and indeed necessary). The question then 
becomes what interactions between the node 
super-users are delineated in the static 
agreement and what can be assumed at run-
time. 
 
4. VOTES Implementation 
 
The technical implementation of the VOTES 




Figure 5: architecture of a single node 
within the CVO. 
 
The basic operation is as follows: 
 
• The user logs into the portal at a 
particular node - this can be directly 
or via Shibboleth (not shown above).  
• The portal server checks the local 
resource files to discover the available 
grid servers, data servers and driving 
databases. 
• A request containing the user’s role 
and a specific trial is sent to the grid 
server. 
• The grid server consults the local 
access matrix and returns the 
parameters for the resources that the 
user can query for that trial. These are 
presented to the user as a list of 
check-boxes, with the option to 
specify conditions if desired. 
• The user makes their selection of 
parameters and submits them. These 
are constructed into a single query 
distributed across the various 
resources. 
• The query is sent from the grid server 
to the data server, where it is wrapped 
as an OGSA-DAI service request and 
is passed to the driving database. 
• The driving database executes the 
distributed query over the resources 
under its guard and joins the various 
distributed results into one single 
result. 
• This result is sent back to the data 
server and then to the grid server, 
where it is transformed into readable 
HTML and finally presented to the 
user through the portal again. 
 
The various grid technologies used in this 
infrastructure are: GridSphere [7] – the portal 
server is designed to give secure and user-
friendly access specifically for grid services; 
Globus Toolkit v4.0 [8] – the grid server uses 
the Axis [15] component of this package to 
implement stateful grid services passing 
between components the authorization 
information and the actual data queries; 
OGSA-DAI [9] – the data server is based on 
the OGSA-DAI technology and allows to 
present database resources in the form of a 
service-oriented architecture using XML.  
The databases exist on a test infrastructure 
at the National e-Science Centre in Glasgow, 
comprised of variations of SQL Server, 
MySQL and Oracle. They contain 
representative, but “dummy”, data-sets that use 
the actual software and schemas that are 
currently in use by the majority of systems in 
the NHS in Scotland. These include: GPASS 
[10] – the main software application used by 
primary healthcare specialists across Scotland; 
SCI Store [11] – a centralised repository of 
clinical information across Scotland, which is 
routinely updated by participating practises; 
Scottish Morbidity Records [12] – another 
centralised data set that records all hospital 
visits throughout Scotland.  
In combination with the BrainIT project 
the portal has been specifically extended to 
incorporate brain MRI scans and a variety of 
physiological data from the Southern General 
Hospital in Glasgow. Figure 7 shows 
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snapshots of the images, and the extended data 
repository accessible to authorised users.  
As discussed, security in this 
infrastructure is implemented on two levels: at 
the VO level, through the use of the access 
matrix, and at the local resource level, through 
the individual database management systems. 
Through the combination of these paradigms it 
is possible to marry the necessity of local 
administrators retaining control of their 
resources and this control being scaled up to 
the VO-level.  
A further extension of the portal has been 
to incorporate the Shibboleth model of 
distributed authentication (see section 2). This 
allows access to the Glasgow node by a user 
from a remote site that is subscribed to the 
same federation as the node. This significantly 
widens the scope of access to the VOTES 
resources, whilst maintaining effective security. 
 
 Figure 6: the Shibboleth attributes relevant 
to the user “guest2”. Note how the user has 
different roles for different trials, with 
varying levels of privilege. 
 
In an attempt to make the portal more user-
friendly the implementation has inserted the 
roles for the different trials into the Shibboleth 
role database. Through results of the Dynamic 
Virtual Organisations for e-Science Education 
(DyVOSE) project [19] we are now able to 
push attributes to remote (trusted) authorities 
for allocation to their own users which can 
subsequently be used for local authorisation 
decisions [20, 21]. This overcomes the largely 
static model of security upon which Shibboleth 
federations are based. In the UK a core set of 
eduPerson attributes have been agreed for UK–
wide Shibboleth federations. Extending this to 
support more dynamic VO-specific roles and 




Several security and authorization solutions 
already exist in the grid community, but none 
entirely meet the specific requirements of the 
clinical and neurological domains. As such, 
other innovative solutions are required to make 
distributed data federation systems in these 
domains a viable reality. In this paper we have 
presented one possible solution from the 
VOTES project. 
The specific challenges and issues of the 
clinical domain highlighted in this paper are 
crucial before further progress in this field can 
be made. It is clear that a flexible solution is 
required that will allow access to individual 
patient data fields, on a “pick and choose” 
basis, whilst maintaining rigorous levels of 
access control definition and enforcement. 
It is also clear that a secure yet readily 
accessible administrative access point is 
required for any flexible solution. The 
development of an administrative portal in the 
VOTES project is a step towards this goal but 
the delineation of duties between the different 
types of administrator is an issue that still 
needs more discussion and definition. 
The issues tackled in this paper are popular 
topics of research and other efforts are being 
made as reflected in the recent call for 
proposals by the Open Middleware 
Infrastructure Institute (OMII) for a research 
project investigating the viability of portals 
used to define and implement access control 
policies for generic systems [13]. It is also the 
case that any of the innovative solutions 
presented will almost certainly build on the 
theories and modules of the currently available 
software. For instance, the DyVOSE 
Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) [14] allows 
delegation of credentials between two 
institutions that only have a limited degree of 
trust between them. Using this technology it is 
possible to exert access control on remote 
users through local policies, without having to 
scale up to an aggregated authorization policy 
for the entire VO. 
The VOTES and BrainIT projects are 
primarily pioneering, investigative projects. 
The solutions presented here are only possible 
scenarios that serve to highlight the challenges 
and issues as much as providing a production 
level answer to the questions posed. However, 
before any national or global clinical 
infrastructures are created a thorough 
exploration and demonstration of viable 
systems are needed. This work is laying the 
foundation for such future infrastructures with 
future Scottish-wide efforts looking to adopt 
these efforts to provide production level 
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Figure 7: The extended neurological data incorporated into the VOTES portal. The patient data is 
at the back, the close-up of the image is returned when the original image is clicked upon, and a 
sample of the in-depth lab data for this patient can be seen on top. 
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